In American politics, the Southern
strategy refers to a Republican method
of carrying Southern states and
conservative Democratic voters in the
latter decades of the 20th century and
first decade of the 21st century by
exploiting racism among white voters.
Although the phrase "Southern strategy"
is often attributed to Richard Nixon
strategist Kevin Phillips, he did not
originate it, but merely popularized it.
In an interview included in a 1970 New
York Times article, he touched on its
essence:
From now on, the Republicans are never
going to get more than 10 to 20 percent
of the Negro vote and they don't need
any more than that... but Republicans
would be shortsighted if they weakened
enforcement of the Voting Rights Act.
The more Negroes who register as
Democrats in the South, the sooner the
Negrophobe whites will quit the
Democrats and become Republicans. That's
where the votes are. Without that
prodding from the blacks, the whites
will backslide into their old
comfortable arrangement with the local
Democrats.
While Phillips was concerned with
polarizing ethnic voting in general, and
not just with winning the white South,
this was by far the biggest prize
yielded by his approach. Its success
began at the presidential level,
gradually trickling down to statewide
offices, the Senate and House, as legacy
segregationist Democrats retired or
switched to the GOP. The strategy
suffered a brief apparent reversal
following Watergate, with broad support
for the Southern Democrat Jimmy Carter
in the 1976 election. But with Ronald
Reagan kicking off his 1980 Republican
presidential campaign proclaiming
support for "states' rights" in
Philadelphia, Mississippi, the site of
the murder of three civil rights workers
in 1964's Freedom Summer, it appeared
the Republican Party was going to build
on the Southern Strategy again. Although
another Southern Democrat Bill Clinton
was twice elected President, winning a
handful of Southern states in 1992 and
1996, he won more votes outside the
South and could have won without
carrying any Southern state.
From 1948 to 1984 the Southern
states, traditionally a stronghold for
the Democrats, became key swing states,
providing the popular vote margins in
the 1960, 1968 and 1976 elections.
During this era, several Republican
candidates expressed support for states'
rights, which was a signal of opposition
to federal enforcement of civil rights
for blacks and intervention on their
behalf, including passage of legislation
to protect the franchise.
Some have argued that this phenomenon
had more to do with the economics than
it had to do with race. In The End of
Southern Exceptionalism, political
scientists Richard Johnston of the
University of Pennsylvania and Byron
Shafer of the University of Wisconsin
wrote that the Republicans' gains in the
South corresponded to the growth of the
upper middle class in that region. This
group felt that their economic interests
were better served by the Republicans
than the Democrats. According to
Johnston and Shafer, working-class white
voters in the South continued to vote
for Democrats until the 1990s. In
summary, Shafer told The New York Times,
"[whites] voted by their economic
preferences, not racial preferences".
Many Republican political campaign
operatives, such as Ken Mehlman who
openly discussed how Republicans exploit
racial tension for Republican electoral
benefit, disagree with this assessment.
In recent years, the term "Southern
strategy" has been used in a more
general sense, in which cultural themes
are used in an election —
primarily but not exclusively in the
American South. In the past, issues such
as busing, or states' rights appealed to
white angst about integration. Today,
appeals to conservative values name
cultural issues such as gay marriage,
abortion, and religion. This has also
been viewed as the Southernization of
American politics.
Disfranchisement and the Solid South
After the American Civil War,
Southern states gained additional seats
in the House of Representatives and
representation in the Electoral College
because freed slaves were granted full
citizenship and suffrage. Southern white
resentment stemming from the Civil War
and the Republican Party’s policy of
Reconstruction kept most southern whites
in the Democratic Party, but the
Republicans could compete in the South
with a coalition of freedmen, Unionists
and highland whites.
Rising intimidation and violence by
white paramilitary groups such as the
White League and Red Shirts supporting
the Democratic Party during the mid to
late-1870s contributed to turning out
Republican officeholders and suppressing
the black vote. After the North agreed
to withdraw federal troops under the
Compromise of 1877, white Democrats used
a variety of tactics to reduce voting by
African Americans and poor whites. In
the 1880s they began to pass legislation
making election processes more
complicated.
From 1890 to 1908, the white Democratic
legislatures in every Southern state
enacted new constitutions or amendments
with provisions to disfranchise most
blacks and tens of thousands of poor
whites. Provisions required complicated
processes for poll taxes, residency,
literacy tests and other requirements
which were subjectively applied against
blacks. As blacks lost their vote, the
Republican Party lost its ability to
effectively compete. There was a
dramatic drop in voter turnout as these
measures took effect, a drop in
participation that continued in Texas
and across the South.
The South became solidly white
Democratic until past the middle of the
20th century. Effectively, Southern
white Democrats controlled all the votes
of the expanded population by which
Congressional apportionment was figured.
Many of their representatives achieved
powerful positions of seniority in
Congress, giving them control of
chairmanships of Congressional
committees. African Americans could not
elect one person to represent their
interests and filled no local elected
offices, where government was closest to
the people. Because they could not be
voters, they were also prevented from
being jurors and serving in local
offices. Services and institutions for
them in the segregated South were
chronically underfunded.
During this period, Republicans held
only a few House seats from the South.
Between 1880 and 1904, Republican
presidential candidates in the South
received between 35 and 40 percent of
that section's vote (except in 1892,
when the 16 percent for the Populists
knocked Republicans down to 25 percent).
From 1904 to 1948, Republicans received
more than 30 percent of the section's
votes only in the 1920 (35.2 percent,
carrying Tennessee) and 1928 elections
(47.7 percent, carrying five states).
The only important political role of the
South in presidential elections came in
the 1912 election, when it provided the
delegates to select Taft over Theodore
Roosevelt in that year's Republican
convention.
During this period, Republicans
occasionally supported anti-lynching
bills, which were filibustered by
Southern Democrats in the Senate, and
appointed a few black placeholders. In
the 1928 election, the Republican
candidate Herbert Hoover rode the issues
of prohibition and anti-Catholicism to
carry five former Confederate states,
with 62 of the 126 electoral votes of
the section. After his victory, Hoover
attempted to build up the Republican
Party of the South, transferring
patronage away from blacks and toward
the same kind of white Protestant
businessmen who made up the core of the
Northern Republican Party. With the
onset of the Great Depression, which
severely impacted the South, Hoover soon
became extremely unpopular. The gains of
the Republican Party in the South were
lost. In the 1932 election, Hoover
received only 18.1 percent of the
Southern vote for re-election.
WWII and population changes
The subsequent policies of Franklin
Roosevelt provided much needed financial
help and development welcomed in the
South, precluding Republican growth in
the region. In the 1948 election, after
Truman had desegregated the Army, a
group of Southern Democrats known as
Dixiecrats split from the Democratic
Party in reaction to the inclusion of a
strong civil rights plank in the party's
platform. This followed a floor fight
led by Minneapolis Mayor (and soon-to-be
Senator) Hubert Humphrey.
The disaffected Democrats formed the
States' Rights Democratic, or Dixiecrat,
Party, and nominated Governor Strom
Thurmond of South Carolina for
president; he won four Southern states.
The main plank of the States' Rights
Democratic Party was maintaining
segregation and Jim Crow in the South.
The Dixiecrats, failing to deny the
Democrats the presidency in 1948, soon
dissolved, but the split lingered. In
1964, Thurmond was one of the first
conservative southern Democrats to
switch to the Republicans.
In addition to the splits in the
Democratic Party, the population
movements associated with World War II
had a significant effect on the makeup
of the South. From 1940-1970, more than
5 million African Americans migrated
from the South to the North and West in
the second Great Migration. They moved
for better jobs, education for their
children, and quality of life, including
the chance to vote. Starting before
WWII, many took jobs in the defense
industry in California and major
industrial cities of the Midwest.
Changes in industry, growth in
universities and the military
establishment in turn attracted Northern
transplants to the South, and bolstered
the base of the Republican Party. In the
post-war Presidential campaigns,
Republicans did best in the
fastest-growing states of the South with
the most Northern settlers. In the 1952,
1956 and 1960 elections, Virginia,
Tennessee and Florida went Republican
all three times, while Louisiana went
Republican in 1956, and Texas twice
voted for Eisenhower and once for
Kennedy. In 1956, Eisenhower received
48.9 percent of the Southern vote,
becoming only the second Republican in
history after Grant to get a plurality
of Southern votes.
The states of the Deep South remained
loyal to the Democratic Party, which had
not officially repudiated segregation.
Indeed, the "Yankee transplant" does not
explain the Republican rise in the "Deep
South" states. Mississippi, Alabama,
Arkansas and North Carolina actually
lost population and Congressional seats
from the 1950s to the 1970s, while
Georgia, South Carolina, and Louisiana
remained static. From the turn of the
century, Mississippi's constitution was
hostile to industry.
The racial turmoil in the Deep South
states during the Civil Rights Movement
precluded many businesses from
relocating there. The "Year of
Birmingham" in 1963 highlighted racial
issues in Alabama. Through the spring,
there were marches and demonstrations to
end legal segregation. The Movement's
achievements in settlement with the
local business class were overshadowed
by bombings and murders by the Ku Klux
Klan, most notoriously in the deaths of
four girls in the bombing of the
Sixteenth Street Baptist Church.
After George Wallace was elected as
Governor of Alabama, he helped link the
concept of states' rights and
segregation, both in speeches and by
creating crises to provoke Federal
intervention. He opposed integration at
the University of Alabama, and
collaborated with the Ku Klux Klan in
disrupting court-ordered integration of
public schools in Birmingham in 1963.
Many of the so-called states' rights
Democrats were attracted to the 1964
presidential campaign of Republican
Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona.
Goldwater was notably more conservative
than previous Republican nominees, such
as Dwight D. Eisenhower. Goldwater's
principal opponent in the primary
election, Governor Nelson Rockefeller of
New York, was widely seen as
representing the more moderate (and
pro-Civil Rights), Northern wing of the
party (see Rockefeller Republican,
Goldwater Republican). Rockefeller's
defeat in the primary is often seen as a
turning point towards a more
conservative Republican party. It was
the beginning of a long decline for
moderate and especially liberal
Republicans. Goldwater’s primary victory
is also seen as a shift of the center of
Republican power to the West and South.
In the 1964 presidential campaign, Barry
Goldwater ran a conservative campaign,
part of which emphasized "states'
rights." Goldwater's 1964 campaign was a
magnet for conservatives. Goldwater
broadly opposed strong action by the
federal government. Although he had
supported all previous federal civil
rights legislation, Goldwater made the
decision to oppose the Civil Rights Act
of 1964. His stance was based on his
view that the act was an intrusion of
the federal government into the affairs
of states and, second, that the Act
interfered with the rights of private
persons to do business, or not, with
whomever they chose. In addition,
Goldwater's primary delegate slate from
the South had no blacks, but was filled
instead with white segregationists.
All this appealed to white Southern
Democrats, and Goldwater was the first
Republican to win the electoral votes of
the Deep South states (Louisiana,
Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, and South
Carolina) since Reconstruction. However,
Goldwater's vote on the Civil Rights Act
proved devastating to Goldwater’s
campaign everywhere outside the South
(besides Dixie, Goldwater won only in
Arizona, his home state), contributing
to his landslide defeat in 1964. A
Lyndon B. Johnson ad called "Confessions
of a Republican," which ran in the
North, associated Goldwater with the Ku
Klux Klan. At the same time, Johnson’s
campaign in the Deep South publicized
Goldwater’s full history on civil
rights. In the end, Johnson swept the
election.
Senator Goldwater’s position was at odds
with most of the prominent members of
the Republican Party, dominated by
so-called Eastern Establishment and
Midwestern Progressives. A higher
percentage of the Republican Party
supported the Civil Rights Act of 1964
than did the Democratic Party, as they
had on all previous Civil Rights
legislation. The Southern Democrats
mostly opposed their Northern Party
mates―and their presidents (Kennedy and
Johnson) on civil rights issues.
Roots of the Southern strategy
Lyndon Johnson was concerned that his
endorsement of Civil Rights legislation
would endanger his party in the South,
but he believed that it was the morally
right thing to do. The national
Democratic party supported integration
and passage of civil rights legislation
to correct injustices. In the election
of 1968, Richard Nixon saw the cracks in
the Solid South as an opportunity to tap
into a group of voters who had long been
beyond the reach of the Republican
Party.
Against the background of the long
Vietnam War, in 1968 social turbulence
and volatility continued. On April 4,
1968, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. was
assassinated. Winner of the Nobel Peace
Prize and founder of the Southern
Christian Leadership Conference, he was
the most well-known national leader of
the Civil Rights Movement. His death was
followed by rioting by despairing
African Americans in inner-city areas in
major cities throughout the country.
King’s policy of non-violence had
already been superseded by activities of
more radical blacks and by the Student
Nonviolent Coordinating Committee. There
were also protests, often violent,
against the Vietnam War. The drug
subculture caused alarm among many
adults.
With the aid of Harry Dent and South
Carolina Senator Strom Thurmond, who had
switched parties in 1964, Richard Nixon
ran his 1968 campaign on states' rights
and "law and order." Many liberals
accused Nixon of pandering to Southern
whites, especially with regard to his
"states' rights" and "law and order"
stands.
The independent candidacy of George
Wallace, former Democratic governor of
Alabama, partially negated the Southern
strategy. With a much more explicit
attack on integration and black civil
rights, Wallace won all of Goldwater's
states (except South Carolina), as well
as Arkansas and one of North Carolina's
electoral votes. Nixon picked up
Virginia, Tennessee, North Carolina,
South Carolina and Florida, while
Democratic nominee Hubert Humphrey won
only Texas in the South. In the 1972
election, Nixon swept the South, winning
more than 70 percent of the popular vote
in the Deep South states and Florida,
and over 60 percent in all the other
states of the former Confederacy.
Despite his appeal to Southern whites,
Nixon parlayed a wide perception as a
moderate into wins in other states, and
he took a solid majority in the
electoral college. He was able to appear
moderate to most Americans because the
Southern strategy referred to
integration obliquely through states'
rights and busing that were emotionally
charged for voters in the South.
Evolution
As civil rights grew more accepted
throughout the nation, basing a general
election strategy on appeals to "states'
rights" as a naked play against civil
rights laws would have resulted in a
national backlash. In addition, the idea
of "states' rights" was subsumed within
a broader meaning than simply a
reference to civil rights laws,
eventually encompassing federalism as
the means to forestall Federal
intervention in the culture wars. Money
was found to help support the building
and funding of a large number of
independent, conservative churches
across the South and Midwest which could
be expected to support the conservative
social agenda. Most successful in this
was Roe Messner who has built more than
1,700 churches including several
megachurches.
On August 4, 1980, Ronald Reagan began
his presidential campaign with a speech
near Philadelphia, Mississippi at the
annual Neshoba County Fair. During the
speech, Reagan told the crowd, "Programs
like education and others should be
turned back to the states and local
communities with the tax sources to fund
them. I believe in states’ rights. I
believe in people doing as much as they
can at the community level and the
private level." He went on to promise to
"restore to states and local governments
the power that properly belongs to
them." Philadelphia was the scene of the
June 21, 1964 murder of civil rights
workers James Chaney, Andrew Goodman,
and Michael Schwerner, and Reagan's
critics alleged that the presidential
candidate was signaling a racist message
to his audience. Reagan's defenders
disagree and point out that he spoke to
the National Urban League, a civil
rights organization, a few days later.
In addition to presidential campaigns,
charges of racism have been made about
subsequent Republican campaigns for the
House of Representatives and Senate in
the South. The Willie Horton commercials
used by supporters of George H. W. Bush
against Michael Dukakis in the election
of 1988 were considered by some,
including Jesse Jackson, Lloyd Bentsen,
and many newspaper editors, to be
racist. The 1990 re-election campaign of
Jesse Helms attacked his opponent's
alleged support of "racial quotas," most
notably through an ad in which a white
person's hands are seen crumpling a
letter indicating that he was denied a
job because of the color of his skin.
Some professional academics (historians,
political scientists, sociologists,
culture critics, etc.) and most
Democratic Party supporters argue that
support for what conservative acolytes
depict as a new "Federalism" in the
Republican Party platform is, and always
has been, nothing but a code word for
the politics of resentment, of which
racism provides the fuel.
Bob Herbert, a New York Times columnist,
reported a 1981 interview with Lee
Atwater, published in Southern Politics
in the 1990s by Prof. Alexander P. Lamis,
in which Lee Atwater discussed politics
in the South:
You start out in 1954 by saying,
"Nigger, nigger, nigger." By 1968 you
can't say "nigger" — that hurts you.
Backfires. So you say stuff like forced
busing, states' rights and all that
stuff. You're getting so abstract now
that you're talking about cutting taxes,
and all these things you're talking
about are totally economic things and a
byproduct of them is that blacks get
hurt worse than whites.
And subconsciously maybe that is part
of it. I'm not saying that. But I'm
saying that if it is getting that
abstract, and that coded, that we are
doing away with the racial problem one
way or the other. You follow me —
because obviously sitting around saying,
"We want to cut this," is much more
abstract than even the busing thing, and
a hell of a lot more abstract than
"Nigger, nigger."
Herbert wrote in the same column,
"The truth is that there was very little
that was subconscious about the G.O.P.'s
relentless appeal to racist whites.
Tired of losing elections, it saw an
opportunity to renew itself by opening
its arms wide to white voters who could
never forgive the Democratic Party for
its support of civil rights and voting
rights for blacks."
In later decades, some analysts made the
argument that Southern whites' move to
the Republican Party had more to do with
whites' voting for their economic
interests than racism. Clay Risen wrote
in a review of The End of Southern
Exceptionalism, a scholarly work by
Richard Johnston and Byron Shafer, "In
the postwar era... the South transformed
itself from a backward region to an
engine of the national economy, giving
rise to a sizable new wealthy suburban
class. This very busy and perhaps,
therefore, distracted class, not
surprisingly, began to vote for the
party, it perceived, best represented
its economic interests: the Republican
Party.
Some analysts viewed the 1990s as the
apogee of Southernization or the
Southern strategy, given that the
Democratic president Bill Clinton and
vice-president Al Gore were from the
South, as were Congressional leaders on
both sides of the aisle. Cultural values
became the battleground of national and
local elections.
Modern appraisal in the Republican
party
The Southern Strategy was used as
recently as the 2000 election. During
this election, a push poll suggested to
conservative Republican South Carolina
primary voters that primary opponent
John McCain had fathered an
"illegitimate black child." (In fact,
Cindy McCain had adopted a baby from a
Bangladeshi orphanage.) McCain was
defeated.
Following the 2004 re-election of
President George W. Bush, in which few
African Americans voted for Bush and
other Republicans, Ken Mehlman, the
Chairman of the RNC and Bush's campaign
manager, delivered several speeches at
meetings with African-American business,
community, and religious leaders in
which he apologized for his party's use
of the Southern Strategy in the past.
When asked about the southern strategy
that used race as an issue to build GOP
dominance in the once Democratic South,
Mehlman replied, "Republican candidates
often have prospered by ignoring black
voters and even by exploiting racial
tensions," and, "By the '70s and into
the '80s and '90s, the Democratic Party
solidified its gains in the
African-American community, and we
Republicans did not effectively reach
out. Some Republicans gave up on winning
the African-American vote, looking the
other way or trying to benefit
politically from racial polarization. I
am here today as the Republican chairman
to tell you we were wrong." However,
many prominent Republican and
conservative commentators denounced
Mehlman for his apology, Rush Limbaugh
and Sean Hannity among them.
In the 2006 campaign for Tennessee's
Senate seat, a controversial political
advertisement paid for by the RNC
featured a series of characters
facetiously offering their support for
black Democratic candidate Harold Ford,
Jr. One character was a white woman ―
wearing a strapless dress which made her
appear naked ― who claimed to have met
Ford at a Playboy party. At the end of
the ad, she requested that Ford call
her. Critics accused the RNC of race
baiting by playing on negative views of
mixed-race relationships. Ford lost the
election.
Use during the 2008 Democratic
primary
Pundits such as Rush Limbaugh and
Roland Martin have suggested that the
campaign of white Senator Hillary
Clinton would use a "Southern strategy"
to suggest that African-American support
in South Carolina for black rival Barack
Obama was related to his race and not
his individual appeal to voters.
Limbaugh said they will be "giving
nothing to Obama, blaming it all on
racial identity politics, or crediting
it for that. You watch. They'll do
something." In this view, subsequent
primaries would be affected by the
introduction of race and follow the
pattern of the Southern strategy.
Following Obama's victory in the South
Carolina primary on January 26, analysts
on CNN described statements made by
former President Bill Clinton on behalf
of Senator Clinton's campaign as part of
Senator Clinton's "Southern strategy."
They noted former President Clinton's
comparison of Obama's 2008 presidential
campaign to those of Jesse Jackson in
1984 and 1988. In his interview with
George Stephanopoulus, Barack Obama
pointed out that Clinton was referring
to history more than 20 years old and
contended that his campaign and win were
different.
The decline of Southernization and
Southern strategy
The decisive victory of Democratic
Senator Barack Obama in the 2008
presidential election was taken by
commentators to represent the end of the
Southern Strategy. In addition to taking
the Northeast and upper Midwest, Obama
gained majority support in Virginia,
Maryland, Delaware, and North Carolina,
where demographics were changing
markedly, as well as in some
southwestern of Nevada, Colorado, New
Mexico and the Pacific state of
California that had previously voted for
Republican candidates. The Republican
candidate Senator John McCain received
the most votes in areas that were more
poor, less educated and more white than
those that voted for Obama.
The New Hispanic America
The New Hispanic America includes
California, Nevada, Colorado, New Mexico
and Florida. Arizona and Texas will be
in play in 2010 and are expected to be
added to the New Hispanic America.